Holding The World Bank Accountable for the Leakage of Funds From Africa’s Health Sector by Marouf, Fatma E.
Texas A&M University School of Law
Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
2010
Holding The World Bank Accountable for the
Leakage of Funds From Africa’s Health Sector
Fatma E. Marouf
Texas A&M University School of Law, fatma.marouf@law.tamu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, International Humanitarian Law
Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fatma E. Marouf, Holding The World Bank Accountable for the Leakage of Funds From Africa’s Health Sector, 12 Health & Hum. Rts. J. 95
(2010).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/749
volume 12, no. 1 health and human rights • 95
health and human rights in practice
www.hhrjournal.org
holding the world bank accountable 




This article explores the accountability of  international financial institutions (IFIs), 
such as the World Bank, for human rights violations related to the massive leakage 
of  funds from sub-Saharan Africa’s health sector. The article begins by summarizing 
the quantitative results of  Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys performed in six 
African countries, all showing disturbingly high levels of  leakage in the health sector. 
It then addresses the inadequacy of  good governance and anticorruption programs in 
remedying this problem. After explaining how the World Bank’s Inspection Panel 
may serve as an accountability mechanism for addressing the leakage of  funds, dis-
cussing violations of  specific Bank policies and procedures that would support a claim 
related to leakage and examining the relevance of  human rights concerns to such as 
claim, the article explores some of  the Panel’s limitations and the positive steps taken 
to address these concerns.
introduction
This article explores the accountability of  international financial institu-
tions (IFIs), such as the World Bank, for human rights violations as they 
relate to the massive leakage of  funds from sub-Saharan Africa’s health 
sector. The actual extent of  such leakage has slowly surfaced over the 
past decade through the use of  Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys 
(PETS) that trace the funds allocated to a specific sector from the central 
government to frontline providers. While the quantitative results of  such 
surveys are rarely discussed outside the donor community, they reveal 
that, in many cases, the vast majority of  funds never reach clinics and hos-
pitals that actually provide health services. While leakage is not equivalent 
to corruption, it certainly signals a need for monitoring, evaluation, and 
investigation. Large levels of  leakage also indicate that civil society is not 
able to participate effectively in demanding the resources to which they 
are entitled. 
In addressing this topic, the article focuses on four related aspects of  
leakage and its implications for health and human rights. First, it sum-
marizes the quantitative results of  public expenditure tracking surveys 
performed in six African countries, all of  them showing disturbingly 
high levels of  leakage in the health sector. Second, it addresses the inad-
equacy of  good governance and anticorruption programs in remedying 
this problem. Third, it explains how the World Bank’s Inspection Panel 
may serve as an accountability mechanism for addressing the leakage of  
funds, discussing violations of  specific World Bank policies and proce-
dures that would support a claim related to leakage and examining the 
relevance of  human rights concerns to such a claim. Finally, the article 
explores some of  the Panel’s limitations and the positive steps taken to 
address these concerns.
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While arguments regarding the Bank’s direct or 
indirect accountability under international human 
rights law are important, this paper takes a differ-
ent approach, focusing on how to utilize the Bank’s 
internal accountability mechanism — the Inspection 
Panel — as a way to highlight the human rights issues 
related to leakage and push forward interpretations of  
the Bank’s internal policies that conform to interna-
tional human rights law. The main advantage of  this 
approach is that it circumvents many of  the legal hur-
dles involved in attempting to establish direct or indi-
rect accountability. Another benefit of  this approach 
is its potential application to other IFIs, which have 
very similar internal accountability mechanisms mod-
eled after the World Bank’s Inspection Panel.1 
the massive leakage of funds from 
africa’s health sector
Historically, lack of  information about public spend-
ing in key social sectors, such as health and education, 
has made it difficult to hold governments account-
able.2 Poor reporting, highly aggregated data, and 
discretionary allocations all contribute to the prob-
lem, creating nontransparent processes that camou-
flage how allocated funds are actually being used.3 
Traditional methods for assessing outcomes in ser-
vice delivery include household surveys and social 
impact assessments, which generally provide qualita-
tive information. More recently, donors, such as the 
World Bank, have developed the Public Expenditure 
Tracking Survey (PETS) as a diagnostic and monitor-
ing tool to understand problems in budget execution.4 
PETS tracks the flow of  resources through various 
levels of  government to the frontline providers (for 
example, health care clinics and schools) by collect-
ing data at each level and comparing sources, thereby 
determining where resources are being absorbed and 
where they are going astray.5 During the past decade, 
the proliferation of  PETS throughout Africa has 
exposed massive leakage of  funds in the health and 
education sectors. These results, however, have sur-
prisingly received little publicity. 
“Leakage” is generally defined as the share of  
resources intended for, but not received by, front-
line providers.6 While “leakage” is not equivalent to 
corruption, it is often “a good indicator of  corrup-
tion.”7 Consequently, evidence of  substantial leakage 
in a given sector should invite further investigation 
into possible corruption. The results of  PETS con-
ducted in Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana, Zambia, Chad, 
and Kenya all provide firm estimates of  leakage in 
the health sectors. Key findings from these PETS are 
summarized below:
Uganda’s 2000 PETS indicated a leakage rate of  70% 
for drugs and supplies, with the most high-demand drugs 
(such as those used to treat malaria) being the least 
available, while the 1999 PETS indicated that nearly 
90% of  patients made “informal payments” to pro-
viders. PETS performed in 2003–2004 indicated that 
absenteeism rates among health staff  were greater 
than 35% and that 109 staff  out of  a total of  465 
appeared to be “ghosts.”8 
Tanzania’s 1999 PETS found that 41% of  non-wage 
expenditures in health care never reached frontline providers. 
A follow-up survey in 2001 revealed that decentral-
ized funds sent to the districts were all consumed at 
the district level and that there was no cash funding below 
the sector/district level (i.e. only in-kind material reached 
the health care facilities).9 
Ghana’s 2000 PETS found that 80% of  non-wage health 
expenditures never reached frontline providers in 1998–1999 
and that the majority of  resources reaching the dis-
trict level health offices were in-kind materials, not 
cash.10 Consequently, clinics depended mainly on 
internally generated funds (i.e. user fees and pay-
ments for drugs) for all non-salary recurrent expen-
ditures. Indeed, the study found that 40% of  clinics 
did not receive any cash assistance from the government and 
depended solely on internally generated funds for non-salary 
recurrent expenditures.11 
Chad’s 2004 joint PETS-QSDS found that 73% of  
allocated non-wage recurrent expenditures never reached the 
regional health delegations, and over 99% of  the non-wage 
recurrent expenditures allocated to regions never reached local 
health centers.12 Based on the results of  PETS, the study 
team estimated that, if  all public resources officially 
budgeted for regional delegations had reached the 
frontline providers in 2003, the number of  patients 
seeking primary health care in Chad would have more 
than doubled during the year.13 
Kenya’s 2004 PETS found that 38% of  the total funds 
allocated to the health centers never reached their destination, 
25% of  user fees “leaked’ from the facility level, and 
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37% of  the community development funds “leaked” 
at the facility level.14 PETS also found that provinces 
and districts were unaware of  budgets and programs, 
the supervisory capacity of  provincial and district 
authorities were insufficient, and Kenya’s financial 
and accounting systems were inadequate.
Lastly, a 2007 study, which examined leakage and 
delays of  salaries in Zambia’s health sector during 
2005–2006, found that 15% of  health workers did not 
receive all the salaries due to them during the past 12 months, 
78% of  health sector employees experienced delays in receiving 
their salaries, 16% received less than their full salary, and 
10% of  health sector employees had to pay an “expe-
diter’s fee” to obtain their salary.15 
PETS performed in Rwanda (2000 and 2004), 
Mozambique (2002), Nigeria (2002), Senegal (2002), 
Cameroon (2003), and Namibia (2003) likewise indi-
cated significant leakage of  funds, although they 
did not provide quantitative results.16 While PETS 
have clearly provided a powerful tool that identifies 
problems in public expenditure management, reveal-
ing massive leakage of  funds, the World Bank has 
surprisingly found that “the costs and time demands 
involved” make the method “impractical for univer-
sal application.”17 
The high rates of  leakage in Africa’s health sectors, 
particularly with respect to non-wage expenditures 
like medical supplies, have devastating consequences 
for the delivery of  health services.18 While there are 
many complex reasons why Africa’s health sector 
remains poor despite significant increases in donor 
aid, leakage of  funds is one important reason that 
should not be ignored.19 The World Bank’s failure to 
monitor the use of  funds and its refusal to address 
directly large-scale leakage render it at least partially 
responsible for these factors’ negative impact on 
access to health care. 
A recent review of  the World Bank’s health work, 
conducted by the Independent Evaluation Group 
(IEG), an in-house unit, found that monitoring of  
health programs “remains weak” and “evaluation is 
almost nonexistent,” leading to various problems, 
including “an inability to measure the effectiveness 
of  interventions.”20 Performance in Africa was “par-
ticularly weak,” with 73% of  projects categorized as 
unsatisfactory. Moreover, instead of  improving over 
time, IEG states that “outcome ratings in Africa in 
recent years have shown steady declines.”21 According 
to a March 2009 review of  the health sector strategy 
approved by the Bank in 2007, only 25% of  projects 
in sub-Saharan Africa had satisfactory outcomes.22 
These evaluations confirm that the Bank is failing 
to take its monitoring obligations seriously, despite 
the alarming results of  PETS. If  African countries 
are to make any real progress towards meeting their 
Millennium Development Goals, serious efforts 
must be made to hold accountable not only borrow-
ing governments, but also the donors.
the inadequacy of good governance and 
anticorruption programs
Ever since former World Bank President James 
Wolfensohn spoke out against corruption in 1996, 
the Bank has paved the road for donors to take 
various measures to try to ensure that aid reaches 
the intended beneficiaries. These measures include 
governance and anticorruption initiatives, as well 
as establishing internal accountability mechanisms. 
While such efforts represent important strides for-
ward, the IEG’s recent evaluations confirm that the 
public sector reforms are insufficient for addressing 
accountability concerns, especially the large-scale 
leakage described above. In addition, the public sec-
tor reforms are all one-sided, focusing exclusively on 
recipient governments and ignoring the World Bank’s 
joint responsibility for ensuring that aid money actu-
ally benefits the poor. The discussion below focuses 
specifically on the World Bank’s efforts, since the 
Bank considers itself  a leader among donors who 
support anticorruption efforts.
The World Bank’s main public sector reforms (PSR) 
target public financial management, civil service, tax 
administration, and corruption. While such reforms 
have their roots in the 1980s, they expanded con-
siderably during the 1990s.23 The reforms related 
to public expenditure management include, for 
example, restructuring budgets, implementing strong 
central controls, computerizing financial information 
systems, and charging user fees for certain services.24 
The Bank’s anticorruption efforts focus primarily on 
these indirect methods rather than tackling corruption 
head-on.25 Where the Bank has supported direct anti-
corruption efforts, these primarily target bureaucratic 
(i.e. petty) corruption, such as bribe taking, skimming 
marouf
98 • health and human rights volume 12, no. 1
paychecks, and nepotism in appointments.26 The 
Bank’s petty corruption initiatives include creating 
an anticorruption commission with a low-level man-
date, requiring public officials to disclose their assets, 
investigating and prosecuting officials who have 
unaccounted wealth or take bribes, and establishing 
a code of  conduct for public officials.27
These reforms, unfortunately, have not yielded sig-
nificant results, although their outcomes are “inher-
ently difficult to measure.”28 In terms of  both the 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
ratings and corruption rankings, low-income coun-
tries that receive aid for PSR (such as those in sub-
Saharan Africa) have performed little or no better 
than those that did not receive any PSR funding.29 In 
other words, the aid provided for PSR reforms had 
no noticeable impact in the poorest countries. The 
IEG’s 2008 review of  the World Bank’s public sector 
reforms specifically notes that “[i]mplementation of  
the budget — procurement and financial manage-
ment — has still received too little attention” and 
that “civil service reform has been relatively unsuc-
cessful.”30 Commentators have also asserted that the 
Bank’s focus on public expenditure management and 
policy-making capacity remains very technical, and 
therefore, does not include human rights commit-
ments as a key part of  national ownership.31
Making matters worse, the IEG found that most 
of  the Bank’s direct anticorruption initiatives were 
“rarely invoked except to settle political scores.”32 
Only in “rare cases” has the Bank addressed state-
capture (i.e. grand corruption), such as embezzlement 
of  public funds.33 The isolated cases where the Bank 
has addressed state-capture involved “deep political 
and economic crises” that “exposed the corruption 
of  old regimes and brought in new ones dedicated 
to a fresh start, such as in Indonesia in the late 1990s 
and Nigeria after 2003.”34 In failing to address state-
capture directly, the Bank essentially turns a blind 
eye to the massive levels of  leakage discussed above, 
which cannot be due to petty corruption alone. 
The IEG’s 2009 review of  the Bank’s internal con-
trols further underscores the inadequacy of  PSR and 
anticorruption efforts. This assessment was “the 
first of  its kind, not only for the Bank but also for 
all international financial organizations.”35 The IEG 
found that the Bank’s main weaknesses pertain to 
fiduciary controls, resulting in serious risks of  fraud 
and corruption, especially when combined with sig-
nificant deficiencies in the areas of  risk management, 
project financial management, and procurement.36 
Given that public sector reforms have proven largely 
unsuccessful and that the Bank is unwilling to tackle 
state-capture head-on, the current measures for 
ensuring that aid reaches the intended recipients are 
clearly inadequate. In what follows below, I advocate 
using the World Bank’s Inspection Panel as one way 
to compel the Bank to take the issue of  leakage more 
seriously, raising not only violations of  the Bank’s 
own internal policies, but also violations of  closely 
related human rights norms.
using internal accountability 
mechanisms to hold ifis accountable 
for funds leakage
Since the World Bank is failing to take adequate mea-
sures to address the leakage of  funds, how might the 
Bank be held accountable for its acts or omissions? 
While some international human rights treaties, as 
well as highly influential declarations, guidelines, and 
comments, do stress the importance of  international 
cooperation in protecting human rights, holding the 
Bank directly accountable for human rights viola-
tions remains a challenge, since international human 
rights treaties do not impose obligations on inter-
governmental organizations.37 Moreover, although 
the Bank, unlike the International Monetary Fund, 
enjoys only limited immunity, the immunity clause in 
the Bank’s Articles of  Agreement presents another 
potential hurdle to direct accountability.38 
Despite presenting legal hurdles of  its own, argu-
ing that the Bank should be held indirectly account-
able is one way to circumvent these challenges.39 
In 2001, the International Law Commission (ILC) 
adopted Articles on the Responsibility of  States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA). Over the 
next several years, it developed Draft Articles on 
the Responsibility of  International Organizations 
(DARIO). The ILC’s comments indicate that the 
ARSIWA and the DARIO must both be taken “fully 
into account” in analyzing the attribution of  conduct, 
but gaps and tensions between the two documents 
remain, which are slowly being developed and clarified 
through case law.40 Recent decisions by the European 
Court for Human Rights and the UK House of  
Lords have interpreted the DARIO only in military 
context, finding that the acts of  a Member State may 
be attributed to an international organization only if  
it exercises “effective control” over State organs.41 
Courts have yet to address whether the “effective 
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control” doctrine might apply to the actions of  an 
international financial institution, although the ILC 
has noted that, in many non-military situations, the 
conduct may have to be attributed to both the State 
and the international organization.42 
Using the Inspection Panel to bring claims based on 
leakage of  funds
Rather than focusing on the Bank’s direct or indirect 
accountability under international human rights law, 
areas where the legal doctrine is still being developed, 
this paper focuses on the Bank’s internal accountabil-
ity mechanism, the Inspection Panel. The Inspection 
Panel can be an effective means, I suggest, for practi-
tioners to highlight the human rights issues related to 
leakage and to advance interpretations of  the Bank’s 
internal policies that conform to international human 
rights law. As an established, noncontroversial forum 
for claims against the Bank, the Inspection Panel may 
serve as a useful, albeit imperfect, proxy to challenge 
the human rights violations associated with the mas-
sive leakage of  funds from Africa’s health sector. 
This approach is also applicable to other IFIs, which 
have very similar internal accountability mechanisms 
modeled after the World Bank’s Inspection Panel.
The process for accessing the Inspection Panel is rel-
atively simple. Two or more individuals (or an orga-
nization) may submit a written request for inspec-
tion to the Panel if  they believe that their “rights or 
interests have been or are likely to be directly affected 
by an action or omission of  the Bank as a result of  
a failure of  the Bank to follow its own operational 
policies and procedures.”43 The Panel, composed of  
three members who are randomly selected from a list 
of  experts, submits the request to Bank Management 
for a response. After reviewing both the request and 
Management’s response, the Panel makes a recom-
mendation to the Bank’s Board about whether the 
allegations merit an investigation. If  the Board agrees 
to investigate, the Panel conducts the investigation 
and then submits its findings to the Board and Bank 
Management. Management then submits its own rec-
ommendations to the Board, and the Board makes 
the final decision on what actions to take. 
Since its creation in 1993, the Panel has received 
approximately 56 complaints, 18 of  which came from 
Africa.44 While the Panel has addressed various proj-
ects that had a negative impact on the right to health 
(for example, due to environmental contamination 
or displacement of  people), it has not yet received 
a request to investigate the leakage of  funds from 
the health sector (or any other sector). Such leakage 
can and should be brought to the Panel’s attention 
because it stems, at least in part, from the Bank’s fail-
ure to implement several of  its own policies and pro-
cedures. The Bank’s Articles of  Agreement provide 
that “[t]he Bank shall make arrangements to ensure 
that the proceeds of  any loan are used only for the purposes 
for which the loan was granted.”45 This provision is reit-
erated in the Bank’s Operational Policy on Project 
Supervision (OP 13.05), as well as the Operational 
Policy on Financial Management (OP 10.02). OP 
13.05 not only stresses the importance of  monitor-
ing and evaluation to identify problems, but also 
notes the need to prepare implementation comple-
tion reports in order to “account for use of  Bank 
resources.”46 Moreover, OP 10.02 requires the Bank 
to “take… action to rectify the situation” if  the borrower 
fails to maintain acceptable financial management 
arrangements or to submit the necessary financial 
reports by their due dates. 
Finally, in many cases involving leakage, the Bank 
may have violated its Disclosure Policy. Unless bud-
get allocations and the results of  surveys, such as 
PETS, are made available to civil society, people can-
not effectively demand the resources to which they 
are entitled. As noted above, in Kenya, PETS found 
that provinces and districts were unaware of  budgets 
and programs.47 In Chad, PETS demonstrated that 
“the total lack of  transparency of  budgetary infor-
mation at the regional and district levels greatly facili-
tates the capture of  the MOH budget at the central 
level.”48 This lack of  transparency is exacerbated by 
the Bank’s narrow Disclosure Policy which provides 
only a limited list of  the information that may be 
disclosed. Recognizing this issue, the Bank recently 
launched a comprehensive review of  its policy and is 
moving toward disclosing any information that is not 
on a list of  exceptions.49 Under the new policy, which 
will become effective in July 2010, the public should 
have access to numerous documents that are relevant 
to identifying and quantifying leakage, which include 
audited financial reports. Failure to provide or dis-
seminate these documents could support a request 
for investigation by the Panel.
Linking internal policy violation to human rights 
obligations
The internal policy violations discussed above are 
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closely related to both procedural and substantive 
human rights norms. Thus, in drafting a request 
to the Inspection Panel, individuals or groups may 
strengthen their claims by grounding them in the 
language of  human rights, as well as in the texts of  
internal policies. Recent changes in the Bank’s general 
attitude toward human rights, as well as some recent 
decisions by the Inspection Panel, suggest that using 
a human rights framework to interpret the Bank’s 
internal policies may be an effective way to hold the 
Bank accountable for acts and omissions that impli-
cate human rights.
The Bank policies discussed above are particularly 
linked to procedural obligations, as monitoring, 
evaluation, supervision, sound management, and 
investigation are the basic means of  preventing 
violations of  human rights, including the right to 
health and the closely related right to life. While 
human rights treaties do not specify how rights 
should be protected and therefore do not explic-
itly mention the obligation to monitor, evaluate, or 
investigate, according to Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “[i]t 
is now widely accepted that references to ‘ensuring’ 
the full enjoyment of  the enumerated rights in com-
prehensive human rights treaties impose affirmative 
obligations.”50 In fact, “bodies charged with moni-
toring compliance with these human rights treaties 
have insisted that a series of  steps are required to 
ensure the full enjoyment of  the rights at issue, at 
least those — the right to life and to be free of  tor-
ture — where violations are of  the most basic rights 
and thus are of  special concern.”51
The Human Rights Commission (HRC), for exam-
ple, has directly rejected the argument that State par-
ties have no duty to investigate human rights viola-
tions, since there is no explicit provision for such as 
duty.52 Indeed, the HRC has found that State parties 
have “a duty to investigate thoroughly alleged violations 
of  human rights, and in particular . . . violations 
of  the right to life, and to prosecute criminally, try 
and punish those held responsible for such viola-
tions.”53 Although the duty to investigate and provide 
a remedy generally arises in cases involving forced 
disappearance, torture, or death, the large-scale leak-
age of  funds from Africa’s health sector implicates 
the right to life by preventing countless individuals 
from obtaining life-saving medical care. Indeed, the 
European Commission has interpreted the right to 
life as not only preventing the unlawful taking of  life, 
but also creating a positive obligation to take appro-
priate steps to safeguard lives.54 Moreover, some 
courts have specifically found that the right to life 
creates positive obligations to provide adequate and 
competent medical care.55 Consequently, even if  the 
duty to investigate were limited to cases involving 
violations of  the most fundamental rights, the mas-
sive leakage of  funds from the health sector arguably 
falls within that class of  cases.56
In addition, the Bank’s disclosure policy is closely 
linked to the right to the information, which is both 
substantive and procedural in nature.57 Utilizing 
human rights language may be especially helpful 
in situations where the Bank’s current disclosure 
policy or its revised policy falls short of  providing 
the desired information. Groups such as the Global 
Transparency Initiative point out several shortcom-
ings with the Bank’s proposed revisions to its disclo-
sure policy, including overly-broad exceptions, third 
party veto power over release of  information, lack 
of  detail about how requests for information will 
be processed, and the absence of  an independent 
appeals body.58 Even the IEG recently recommended 
“making better information public . . . in ways that 
stimulate public demand for more efficient and less 
corrupt service delivery.”59 Combining language 
about the right to information with language about 
the Bank’s disclosure policy may therefore be the 
most persuasive and powerful means of  triggering an 
investigation by the Panel. 
The right to participation is another right, with both 
substantive and procedural aspects, that is closely 
related to the right to information. The World Bank’s 
own diagnostic studies on governance and corrup-
tion show that “external voice” (that is, the ability of  
non-governmental actors to demand information and 
accountability) is likely the key determinant in adher-
ence to pro-poor priorities and financial probity.60 
In 2008, the IEG confirmed that “corruption can 
be substantially reduced only when the supply-side 
reforms are complemented by systematic efforts to 
increase the citizens’ capability to monitor and chal-
lenge abuses of  the system and to inform the citizens 
about their rights and entitlements.”61 Yet “[i]ncreas-
ing awareness of  the potential role of  civil society in 
fighting corruption has only materialized in a few of  
the Bank’s anticorruption lending programs.”62 The 
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Bank’s failure to protect civil society’s right to partici-
pation in its anticorruption programs clearly contrib-
utes to the problem of  leakage and should therefore 
be raised as an issue in requests for inspection.63 
Although raising human rights obligations in this 
manner may, at first glance, appear irrelevant or futile, 
recent changes within the Bank and some decisions 
by the Inspection Panel provide support for this 
approach. After years of  hiding behind its mandate 
not to interfere in political affairs and resisting a 
human rights-based approach to development, the 
Bank has finally accepted that its activities implicate 
human rights.64 In 2005, Senior Vice President and 
General Counsel Roberto Danino issued a legal opin-
ion, which stated that “the Articles of  Agreement 
permit, and in some cases require, the Bank to rec-
ognize the human rights dimensions of  its develop-
ment policies and activities since it is now evident 
that human rights are an intrinsic part of  the Bank’s 
mission.”65 The following year, the new Senior Vice 
President and General Counsel Ana Palacio con-
firmed that “the Bank can and sometimes should 
take human rights into consideration as part of  its 
decision making process.”66 She explained that “[t]
he challenge we now face is to clarify how these legal 
concepts should be specifically incorporated into the 
work of  the Bank in order to further its mission of  
sustainable and equitable development.”67 
Palacio recognized not only that the World Bank’s 
activities have a human rights dimension, but also that 
the legal principles enshrined in human rights norms 
provide a “baseline” for assessing development poli-
cies and programs. She further acknowledged that, in 
certain cases, human rights norms generate action-
able legal obligations that arise from both interna-
tional treaties and national laws. In particular, Palacio 
stressed that human rights principles are relevant to 
“[a]reas of  governance or the legal empowerment of  
the poor.” The rights violations related to leakage, 
including lack of  monitoring and investigation, fail-
ure to disclose information, and inadequate participa-
tion are clearly relevant to both of  these areas. 
The Bank’s Inspection Panel has also opened the door 
for claimants to “incorporate a wide range of  human 
rights-related concerns into their complaints.”68 A 
few of  its decisions during the past decade explicitly 
address the relevance of  human rights to the Bank’s 
work. In investigating the Bank’s Chad-Cameroon 
Pipeline Project (2002), Edward S. Ayensu, the for-
mer Chairperson of  the Inspection Panel, found 
“human rights implicitly embedded in various poli-
cies of  the Bank.”69 Mr. Ayensu called upon the Bank 
to be “more forthcoming about articulating its role 
in promoting rights within the countries in which it 
operates” and encouraged the Bank to study “the 
wider ramifications of  human rights violations as 
these relate to the overall success or failure of  policy 
compliance in Bank-financed projects.”70 In its report 
on this project, the Panel stated that human rights 
considerations are relevant when they “impede the 
implementation of  the Project in a manner compat-
ible with the Bank’s policies.”71 Since leakage clearly 
undermines the purpose of  health sector loans and is 
incompatible with the Bank’s policies, it represents a 
situation where human rights implications should be 
taken into account.
More recently, in investigating the Honduras Land 
Administration Project (2007), the Panel found that 
the Bank Policy on Project Appraisal, Operational 
Manual Statement (OMS) 2.20, required Bank-
financed projects to respect international agreements 
on human rights and indigenous peoples when the 
project country is a signatory.72 This was “the first 
time that the Panel explicitly addressed the merits of  
a claim based on international human rights law.” In 
the request for inspection, the indigenous Garifuna 
community claimed that the project violated the 
Government of  Honduras’s obligations under the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 
No. 169. While the Panel stressed that its mandate 
was limited to questions of  internal compliance, it still 
found the ILO Convention provisions applicable to 
the Bank through the OMS 2.20, which requires the 
Bank to ensure that financial activities are consistent 
with a borrower’s international agreements regarding 
the environment, as well as the health and well-being 
of  its citizens. The Panel expressed “serious concern” 
with the General Counsel’s argument that OMS 2.20 
should only apply to international obligations that are 
“essentially of  an environmental nature.” 
These decisions by the Panel, which confirm that the 
Bank must engage with human rights concerns in cer-
tain situations, should be cited and utilized to support 
requests to investigate leakage in health sector loans. 
Such decisions, coupled with the Bank’s nascent rec-
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ognition of  the relevance of  human rights norms to 
its work, provide relevant context for interpreting the 
Bank’s policies and add a deeper dimension to the 
analysis of  these claims.
Challenges in seeking accountability for leakage of  
health sector funds through the inspection panel 
While the Inspection Panel has helped ground the 
dialogue about the relevance of  human rights norms 
to the World Bank’s work by applying these concepts 
in concrete situations, it also has its own limitations 
that hamper its use as a true accountability mecha-
nism. First, the role of  the Requesters is quite lim-
ited, as they do not have an opportunity to rebut 
Management’s response or propose alternative rec-
ommendations for action. Although the Panel clari-
fied in 1999 that Management must consult with the 
requester and other affected people in preparing an 
action plan, the Panel acknowledges that such consul-
tation often does not occur.73 To make matters worse, 
even where Management engages in consultation 
with the Requesters, only Management has access to 
the Panel’s report during this process, which, as the 
Panel recognizes, creates an “unfortunate structural 
asymmetry.”74 The Panel is currently seeking ways 
of  increasing participation by the Requesters and 
affected people in the overall process.75
Second, the standard for establishing a violation is 
quite high. The Panel will address “only those material 
adverse effects, alleged in the request, that have totally or 
partially resulted from serious Bank failure of  compliance 
with its policies and procedures,” thereby requiring 
a causal link between the Bank’s noncompliance 
and the material harm.76 This link may be difficult 
to establish where the issue is leakage from an entire 
health sector. While the Bank clearly violates its own 
internal policies by failing to perform its monitoring, 
evaluation, and supervision responsibilities, it may be 
difficult to show that those violations directly resulted in 
material harm to specific individuals. 
Third, the Panel will not accept a request for inspec-
tion if  at least 95% of  the loan financing has already 
been disbursed.77 Given that PETS take a long time 
to complete and require the collection of  a signifi-
cant amount of  data before reaching any meaningful 
quantitative results, the results of  these surveys may 
not be available until long after disbursement is com-
plete. Under the Bank’s new disclosure policy, how-
ever, other forms of  information should be made 
available that may assist in identifying leakage at an 
earlier stage.
Moreover, even if  the Panel finds that the Bank has 
violated its own policies, it does not have the power 
to make the final decision about what actions the 
Bank should take, if  any, to remedy the situation. 
The Bank’s Board of  Directors, not the Panel, adopts 
the final action plans, which often do not respond 
adequately to the Panel’s findings.78 In addition, the 
Panel lacks powers of  enforcement, restitution, and 
oversight over the implementation of  remedial mea-
sures.79 The Panel is, however, taking steps to address 
this concern. For example, the Panel has made it a 
practice to return to affected areas in order to give 
briefings on the results of  the investigation, and on a 
few occasions, has played a more substantive role in 
post-investigation activities.80 
Thus, while the Panel certainly has its limitations as 
an accountability mechanism, it has been finding new 
ways to address some of  these shortcomings. The 
Panel is a dynamic entity that is being shaped and 
molded by the claims it is asked to address. As more 
and more challenging cases are being brought before 
the Panel, including cases that raise serious human 
rights concerns, the Panel will be forced to explore 
the outer edges of  its mandate and perhaps even 
push those boundaries further.
conclusion
The international community can no longer afford to 
ignore the massive leakage of  donor funds from criti-
cal social sectors, such as health, particularly when 
this leakage occurs in the poorest places on the planet. 
Instead of  blaming only the recipient governments 
for such leakage, solutions should focus on holding 
both donors and borrowers accountable for the use 
of  funds. Although the actions of  IFIs, such as the 
World Bank, helped create the impoverished situa-
tions that plague sub-Saharan Africa today through 
devastating structural adjustment programs, these 
IFIs have largely escaped any true call to account-
ability. 
Holding donors accountable is a legally challeng-
ing task, but it is not impossible. The World Bank’s 
Inspection Panel is one potential venue for holding 
the Bank accountable for leakage of  funds from the 
health sector. The problem of  leakage should be 
framed both in terms of  the Bank’s violations of  its 
volume 12, no. 1 health and human rights • 103
health and human rights in practice
own policies and in terms of  closely related violations 
of  basic human rights obligations. Organizations con-
cerned with the leakage of  health sector funds should 
therefore consider filing a request for inspection with 
the Panel, especially in the absence of  other available 
channels to bring complaints against the Bank. 
Concerns with aid effectiveness and accountability 
are especially critical at present due to an aid climate 
that is shifting from project-specific loans to general 
budget support. Many poverty reduction strategies, 
which cut across multiple sectors, including health, 
are now funded through general budget support, 
whereby the government simply disburses the money 
through its own financial management system. While 
general budget support helps simplify and unify 
procurement, disbursement, and management pro-
cedures, it may also amplify the risk of  leakage by 
making it harder for donors to trace how the funds 
are being used.81 Pledges of  greater funding for the 
health sector may have little meaning if  the Bank 
does not take the necessary steps to ensure that the 
funds actually reach the intended beneficiaries.
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